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RECENT CASES
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE-DIVISION OF






John Cain purchased a $20,000 farm in 1958 giving $3,500 in cash and
a note for $16,500. Before his marriage to Camille in 1959, Cain made
seven payments on the note totalling approximately $1,000. Mr. and Mrs.
Cain lived on the farm for eight years and, until dissolution of their
marriage in 1974, paid approximately $25,000 principal and interest on
the mortgage with martial funds. In 1974, the land was worth $565,000,
less $5,000 outstanding on the mortgage. Upon dissolution the circuit
court set aside the farm to Mr. Cain as separate property. The Springfield
District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed.
3
Marvin Stark purchased a farm in 1957 for $15,000 of which $10,000
was borrowed. In 1961, when he owed $6,000 on the farm, Marvin and
Evelyn were married. In 1965, the couple borrowed $18,000 by mortgag-
ing the farm. They used $6,000 to pay off all of Marvin's old debts
including the remaining first mortgage balance. Twelve thousand dollars
were used to erect a new house and two outbuildings on the farm. Upon
dissolution of their marriage in 1974, the circuit court set aside the farm to
Mr. Stark as separate property. The Kansas City District of the Missouri
Court of Appeals affirmed.
4
Both of these farms were set aside as separate property. The proper-
ties were alike in form of acquisition but differed significantly in causes of
increased value. In Cain, marital funds were used to reduce the encum-
brance on the farm. The total increase in value of the farm was attributable
to external economic conditions. In Stark, marital funds were used both to
reduce the encumbrance on the farm and to improve the farm. The
increase in value of the farm was due to external economic conditions and
the improvements made with marital funds and labor.
The Missouri Divorce Reform Act5 is modeled after the divorce, child
custody, and maintenance sections of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act.6 The Commissioners who drafted the Uniform Act recommended that
the "distribution of property upon the termination of marriage . .. be
1. 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
2. 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
3. 536 S.W.2d at 868.
4. 539 S.W.2d at 781.
5. §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo (1975 Supp.). The Missouri statute modified the
UMDA by adding spousal conduct as an element to be considered in the distribu-
tion of property. In Cain and Stark each party alleged that the other was at fault;
neither court found fault to be a significant factor in the property settlement.
6. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act., (U.L.A.), vol. 9 (master ed., 1973).
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treated, as nearly as possible, like the dissolution of a business partner-
ship."7 In the United States, community property law exists as a model for
distributing marital property on a partnership theory.' Under community
property theory,9 marriage is a partnership in which each partner retains
his or her prior owned assets as separate property.' 0 Property acquired
during the marriage, regardless of title, is presumed to be marital, or
community, property."
Community property law as it exists in the United States is borrowed
from Spain. Under Spanish law if one partner initiated the acquisition of a
piece of property before marriage, the status of the property was fixed and
remained his or her separate property regardless of the source of funds
which ultimately paid for it. The community was reimbursed for the
amount of marital funds used to acquire the property. 12 Income derived
from either separate or marital property was marital. 13 Spanish law distin-
guished between the sources of increase in value of separate property..
Increases due to general economic conditions or derived solely from the
expenditure of separate funds by the owner remained separate. The com-
munity was reimbursed for increases due to improvements made by mari-
tal efforts. The measure of reimbursement was the appreciated value of
the property resulting from the improvements. Title to the improvement
followed title to the property. 14
7. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM
LAWS 111 (1970).
8. FAMILY LAW REPORTER, DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT 57 (1974). Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property
in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 165 (1976).
9. Eight western states are community property states. They are: California,
Texas, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Washington, Louisiana and New Mexico.
10. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
116-18 nn.18-24 (2d ed. 1971); Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-Separate Title and
Community Funds, 44 WASH. L. REV. 379 (1969); Knutson, California Community
Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study and Reform, 39 So. CAL. L. REV. 240 (1966).
11. The presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. If
successfully rebutted, one partner will be deemed to hold the property by himself,
i.e., separate from the community, or marital, property.
12. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 10, at 130-33. The Spanish rule
regarding acquisition, which may be called a title theory, is followed in New Mexico
and Texas. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618, 506 P.2d 775 (1973); Moore v.
Moore, 71 N.M. 495, 379 P.2d 784 (1963); Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.
App. ,1954); 15A AM. JUR. 2d Community Property § 22 (1976).
13. Id. at 140-43, 160-61; Knutson, supra note 10, at 241 states: "The basic
concept underlying the system is a simple one: marriage is a partnership in which
the spouses devote their particular talents, energies and resources to the common
good; and in which acquisitions and gains attributable, directly and indirectly, to
such expenditures of labor and resources are shared by the partnership." Income
may be derived from rents and profits of property as well as wages earned by the
partners and other sources.
14. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 10, at 168-69. Because income
from separate property is community property, the community recognizes an
immediate gain if marital funds or labor improves the separate property.
[Vol. 42
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Some of the states which adopted the Spanish community property
theory have modified it. Under the modified view of acquisition, courts
look to the source of funds used to pay for the property. The courts then
allocate property acquired with both separate and marital funds in propor-
tion as each paid for it. 5 As a result, the property's increase in value due to
external economic conditions is divided when the property is allocated.
This approach, which may be called a "source of funds" theory, is followed
in Idaho 16 and Washington 17 as well as in California.'
8
As an example of the application of the "source of funds" theory,
assume that prior to marriage a woman bought a $10,000 house and paid
for half of it by the time of the marriage, the remainder being paid during
the marriage. No improvements were made on the house. If the marriage
is dissolved, the woman as separate owner is entitled to 50% of the present
value of the house and the other 50% would be divided as marital
property.'
9
All the community property states allow recovery to the community
for improvements to separate property made with martial funds or labor.
20
A majority of the community property states follow Spanish law in that the
measure of recovery is the resultant increased value to the property.2' A
15. In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483,
491 (1973). Community funds were used to pay off indebtedness on the separate
property, a home, acquired before marriage. The court said, "The community has a
pro tanto interest in such property in the ratio that payments on the purchase were
made with community funds bears to the payments made with separate funds."
Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 257 P.2d 721 (1953); Vieux v. Vieux, 80
Cal. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (1926); Note, Characterization of Property in California
When Period of Acquisition Overlaps Creation or Termination of Marital Community, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 815 (1966).
16. Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954).
17. Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash. 340, 115 P. 731 (1911); Heintz v. Brown, 46
Wash. 387, 90 P. 211 (1907).
18. "If the fair market value has increased disproportionately to the increase
in equity, the community is entitled to participate in that increase in a similar
proportion." 29 Cal. App. 3d at 256-57, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 493. Cases exist in states
following the new view which indicate that the courts are looking at the facts of
acquisition and analyzing them under the theory that retiring an encumbrance on
separate property is a type of improvement. Under the rationale of these cases, the
community is allowed a recovery measured by the increased value of the property
in proportion to the amount of marital funds used to retire the encumbrances.
19. In community property theory the marital property is divided equally
between the partners. In Missouri the court has discretion in dividing the marital
property. § 452.330(1), RSMo (1975 Supp.).
20. The problem of the increase in value is caused by the conflict of two basic
principles: "1) that the separate property of the spouses continues as such so long as
it can be identified or, conversely, that the spouses are entitled to compensation or
reimbursement for such property, and 2) that the community is entitled to all fruits
of labors and efforts of both spouses." Bartke, supra note 10, at 383.
21. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461,546 P.2d 1169 (1976); Michelson v. Michel-
son, 551 P.2d 638 (N.M. 1976); Girard v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1975); Hiatt
v. Hiatt, 94 Idaho 367, 487 P.2d 1121 (1971); Tilton v. Tilton, 85 Idaho 245, 378
P.2d 191 (1963); Jacobs v. Hoitt, 119 Wash. 283, 205 P. 414 (1922).
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minority of the states grant recovery measured only by the amount of
marital funds spent on the improvements. 22
The Missouri Divorce Reform Act describes marital property as all
property acquired subsequent to the marriage which is not specifically
excluded by one of the five listed exceptions. 23 Thus, by definition, proper-
ty "acquired" prior to marriage is separate. Income from separate property
produced after the marriage is not one of the enumerated exceptions to
marital property.24 However, if the value of property acquired before
marriage increases during the marriage, the increase is a statutory excep-
tion to marital property, thus it is separate. No definition is given for "in-
crease in value" (i.e., by separate improvements, by joint improvements, or
by economic conditions). Therefore, any marital efforts or funds spent on
separate property would be converted from marital to separate property
unless increases in value are differentiated according to their source and
those resulting from marital improvements are removed from the cate-
gory.25 In Cain the dispute centered on the question of when the farm was
"acquired" because payments on the farm mortgage were made both be-
fore and during the marriage. Mr. Cain argued that the encumbrance was
irrelevant because title to property is unaffected by a mortgage in a lien
state; hence the acquisition or ownership of the property is determined at
inception of title. Mrs. Cain contended that the farm was in part marital
property. She urged the court to adopt the "source of funds" theory on
acquisition which would allocate the farm at its present value to the marital
community in the same proportion as marital money was used to reduce
the encumbrance on the property. Under this theory, acquisition is a
continuing process with property division based upon the proportion of
equity contributed by the parties. This theory would emphasize the under-
22. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618, 506 P.2d 775 (1973).
23. § 452.330(2), RSMo (1975 Supp.).
Marital property means all property acquired by either party subsequent
to marriage except:
1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or
decent;
3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
5) The increase in value of property acquired before marriage.
24. Some community property states have modified the Spanish rule regard-ing income of separate property. Louisiana, Texas and Idaho follow the Spanish
rule; rents and profits of separate property are community property. Five of the
community property states consider that income from separate property remains
separate. DeFuniak says that this is the result of applying common law principles to
a community property system. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 10, at 162.
25. In some community property states the exception is recognized in this
type of situation. "When the investment takes the form of improvements on, ordischarge of encumbrances upon, the separate property of one of the partners, theproblem is not essentially different and the community is entitled to its fair share in
the resulting gain." Bartke, supra note 10, at 419-20.
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lying partnership concepts of the law and de-emphasize the impact of
mortgage law on divorce law. Under this approach, one-sixth of the farm
would be allocated to Mr. Cain and two-thirds to the marital community
according to their respective contributions. The remaining one-sixth would
also be Mr. Cain's because he would remain liable for the balance due on
the mortgage.
Viewing the case as presenting a question of mortgage law, the Cain
court determined that Mr. Cain, the mortgagor, acquired the property
prior to the marriage. This parallels the more traditional community pro-
perty view on acquisition which allocates the entire property to the indi-
vidual who initiated the purchase prior to the marriage regardless of the
source of the funds which ultimately paid for the property. The court of
appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision to award the farm at its entire
value to Mr. Cain. However, the court also awarded Mrs. Cain three parcels
of real property valued at $79,000. The court justified this division on the
fact that a substantial portion of the farm's mortgage had been paid with
marital funds, i.e., Mrs. Cain had a right to reimbursement for marital
funds used in the acquisition of the property.2 6 The validity of encumber-
ing the farm for the amount of reimbursement was not at issue since
additional property existed with which the community could be paid.
The appellate decision did not provide or explicitly utilize any
mathematical formula valuing the marital contribution to acquisition, in-
creasing the marital property by this amount and then allocating a portion
of this additional amount to Mrs. Cain. Utilizing its discretionary powers,27
it divided the property as it deemed just. This method foreclosed the
necessity of exact valuations and allocations as is required under communi-
ty property law.
The Stark court, relying on the Cain decision, awarded the farm to the
husband. However, Cain clearly should have been considered precedent
only for setting aside "separate" property to the one who initiated the
purchase even though an encumbrance existing prior to the marriage was
retired with marital funds, i.e., payment on the 1965 Stark mortgage. The
Stark court gave all increases in value to Mr. Stark, which included those
resulting from the improvements due to the marital funds (i.e., the funds
paid on the loan to build the new house) and the improvements due to
marital efforts (i.e., the work of the spouses in building the new house).
The court acknowledged that "the increased value resulted from improve-
ments constructed on the farm after the marriage with marital funds.128
The improvements (in this case a new house and two outbuildings) clearly
were property acquired subsequent to the marriage. Thus, in order to be
deemed separate property the improvements had to be within one of the
exceptions. The court construed the fifth exception to marital property in
26. 536 S.W.2d at 875.
27. § 452.330(1),RSMo (1975 Supp.).
28. 539 S.W.2d at 783.
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the Missouri Act-an increase in value of separate property-to include the
increase due to additions to the separate property even when the additions
were accomplished solely with the funds and efforts of the community.29
The partnership theory, on which the law of all the community prop-
erty states is based, requires that the community be entitled to share in the
proportionate increase in the value of the property attributable to improve-
ments made by marital funds and labor.3 0 The marital community is
entitled to a return on its investment in the same way as any investor
receives a return on an investment. When the marital community chooses
to invest its funds in the separate property of one partner, the community
is not forced in community property states to forego a return on the
investment. The partnership theory would require that an allocation be
made based on four factors. The court should have allocated to Mr. Stark
the value attributable to his investment prior to marriage and to the
appreciation due to general economic conditions. The marital community
should have been allocated the value of the retirement of encumbrances
and the appreciation due to its improvements of the property. The Stark
court characterized the improvement as a fixture of the separate property
under real property law instead of marital property acquired by marital
efforts and funds during the marriage under the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act.
The interpretations of the Cain and Stark courts are pertinent to
decisions made at the beginning of a marriage. An attorney advising a
client who owns property prior to a marriage can tell the client that he is in
an advantageous position in the event of a divorce. He will keep his
property and any improvements made on it by the couple subject only to
reimbursing the community for actual funds used on the separate proper-
ty. Likewise the attorney would have to advise the client's future spouse
that the investment value of any funds or labor expended on the separate
property by the couple during the marriage would be lost to the non-owner
if divorce should occur. This is the probable outcome because in most cases
the owner of the separate property will have no separate funds to retire the
debt on the separate property, pay taxes and assessments, and improve it as
desired.3' By defining income from separate property as marital income,
the Act has removed the obvious source of separate funds which the owner
could use to maintain and improve separate property. If the Act denies the
community a proportionate share in the increase in the value of the
separate property due to community funds and labor, the non-owner will
be discouraged from allowing marital funds to be contributed to the sepa-
rate property. The non-owner spouse reasonably would want marital funds
and labor invested only in marital property where both partners would be
29. See statute quoted note 23 supra.
30. Waheed v. Waheed, 423 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. App. 1967); Lindsay v.
Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777, 781 (1952).
31. A person may have separate funds acquired before marriage or as a gift,
bequest, devise or descent or in exchange for one of these after marriage.
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